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标题: Segmenting uncertain demand in group-buying auctions 作者: Chen Jian; Kauffman Robert J.; Liu Yunhui; 等. 来源出版物: ELECTRONIC COMMERCE RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS 卷: 9 期: 2 页:

126-147 DOI: 10.1016/j.elerap.2009.03.001 出版年: MAR-APR 2010

被引频次: 1 (来自 Web of Science) Demand uncertainty is a key factor in a seller's decision-making process for products sold through online auctions. We explore demand uncertainty in group-buying auctions in terms of the extent of low-valuation demand and high-valuation demand. We focus on the analysis of a monopolistic group-buying retailer that sells products to consumers who express different product valuations. We also examine the performance of a group-buying seller who faces competitive posted-price sellers in a market for the sale of the same products, under similar assumptions about uncertain demand. Based on a Nash equilibrium analysis of bidder strategies for both of these seller-side competition structures, we are able to characterize the group-buying auction bidders' dominant strategies. We obtained a number of interesting findings. Group-buying is likely to be more effective in settings where there is larger low-valuation demand than high-valuation demand. The structure of demand matters. This finding has relevance to the marketplace for new cameras, next-generation microprocessors and computers, and other high-valuation goods, which are unlikely to be as effectively sold in group-buying markets. We obtained additional results for the case of continuous demand, and find that there is a basis for the seller to improve revenues via effective group-buying auction price curve design. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. [ 查看摘要 ]

标题: Group Buying: A New Mechanism for Selling Through Social Interactions

2. 作者: Jing Xiaoqing; Xie Jinhong

来源出版物: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 卷: 57 期: 8 页: 1354-1372 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1366 出版年: AUG 2011

被引频次: 0 (来自 Web of Science) This paper examines a unique selling strategy, Group Buying, under which consumers enjoy a discounted group price if they are willing and able to achieve a required group size and coordinate their transaction time. We argue that Group Buying allows a seller to gain from facilitating consumer social interaction, i.e., using a group discount to motivate informed customers to work as "sales agents" to acquire less-informed customers through interpersonal information/knowledge sharing. We formally model such an information-sharing effect and examine if and when Group Buying is more profitable than (1) traditional individual-selling strategies, and (2) another popular social interaction scheme, Referral Rewards programs. We show that Group Buying dominates traditional individual-selling strategies when the information/knowledge gap between expert and novice consumers is neither too high nor too low (e.g., for products in the midstage of their life cycle) and when interpersonal information sharing is very efficient (e.g., in cultures that emphasize trust and group conformity, or when implemented through existing online social networks). We also show that, unlike Referral Rewards programs, Group Buying requires information sharing before any transaction takes place, thereby increasing the scale of social interaction but also incurring a higher cost. As a result, Group Buying is optimal when interpersonal communication is very efficient or when the product valuation of the less-informed